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# Linear and Differential Properties of S-boxes with Respect to Modular Addition

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#### Outline

#### Introduction

#### Definitions D-spectrum

L-spectrum

Modular affine equivalence (MAE)

Experimental results All MAE classes Optimal S-boxes

#### Summary



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### Introduction

S-boxes are typically studied in the context of Boolean functions:

- $S: \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^m$ ,
- Linear profile:  $Pr(a^T \cdot x = b^T \cdot S(x))$ .
- Differential profile:  $Pr(S(x) \oplus S(x \oplus \delta_x) = \delta_y)$ .
- Small S-boxes can be easily characterised using affine equivalence<sup>2</sup> (302 classes):

$$S_2(x) = \mathbf{A}_1 \cdot S_1(\mathbf{A}_2 \cdot x \oplus b_2) \oplus b_1$$



<sup>2</sup>Leander, G., Poschmann, A.: On the classification of 4 bit S-boxes. 2007

# Modular S-box properties

#### **Research question**

What properties have small bijective S-boxes with respect to modular addition?

#### Research question refinement

Do the modular properties depend on the quality of S-box w.r.t. standard S-box criteria?



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## Motivation

- Alternative cipher designs:
  - Rotor machines: clocking can be expressed as S(x + t), with + over some Z<sub>n</sub>
  - GOST, Kalyna (and others): Key addition or linear layer with + over some  $\mathbb{Z}_{2^n}$
- Theoretical generalizations of non-linearity properties<sup>3</sup>
- Attacks based on alternative<sup>4</sup> operations<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup>O Grošek, K Nemoga, L Satko: Generalized perfectly nonlinear functions.2000

<sup>4</sup>Calderini M., Sala M.: Elementary abelian regular subgroups as hidden sums for cryptographic trapdoors. 2017

<sup>5</sup>Civino R, Blondeau C, Sala M. Differential attacks: using alternative operations. 2019





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## Notation

- We work in ring  $\mathbb{Z}_{2^n} = (\mathbb{Z}/2^n\mathbb{Z})$
- Addition/subtraction: +/-
- Multiplication: ax
- Division:  $x/a = a^{-1}x$ , for a with gcd(a, 2) = 1
- Affine permutations:

$$A(x) = ax + b$$
, with  $gcd(a, 2) = 1$ 





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# **Differential properties**



Table of differences:

$$D_{(d_x,d_y)} = \left| \{x, \mathcal{S}(x+d_x) - \mathcal{S}(x) = d_y\} \right|$$

- D-spectrum: multiset {D<sub>(dx,dy</sub>)}
- D-criterium:  $D(S) = \max\{D_{(d_x, d_y)}\}$
- Affine function:  $D(f) = 2^n$





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### Linear properties



Linear approximation:

$$L_{(a,b)} = \big| \{x, S(x) = ax + b\} \big|$$

- L-spectrum: multiset {L<sub>(a,b)</sub>}
- L-criterium: *L*(*S*) = max{*L*<sub>(*a*,*b*)</sub>}
- Affine function:  $L(f) = 2^n$



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## Modular affine equivalence

To explore (modular) S-box properties, we can use (modular) affine equivalence (MAE):

$$S_1 \equiv S_2 ext{ iff } A_1 \circ S_1 = S_2 \circ A_2$$

Explicitly:

$$\forall x: S_2(x) = a_1 \cdot S_1(a_2 \cdot x + b_2) + b_1$$

S-box criteria L(S) and D(S) are invariant under MAE.



### Modular affine equivalence

- Class size: at most 2<sup>4n-2</sup>
  - n = 3: 58 classes
  - n = 4: 1277100855 classes (≈ 2<sup>30</sup>)
- Representatives:
  - can always normalize to S(0) = 0, S(1) = 1
  - representative is the first S-box in lex order





## Modular S-box properties and affine equivalence

#### Research question reformulation

What is the statistical distribution of L- and D-criterium in MAE classes of small S-boxes?



Modular affine equivalence (MAE)



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### All MAE classes

Statistics of class representatives based on exhaustive enumeration of 4-bit S-boxes:

	All 1277099568 classes															
DIL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1																
2			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%											
3		0.00%	0.78%	5.04%	2.10%	0.20%	0.00%									
4		0.00%	4.84%	30.44%	15.09%	2.77%	0.22%	0.00%								
5		0.00%	2.82%	15.92%	7.94%	1.89%	0.36%	0.03%	0.00%							
6		0.00%	0.70%	3.78%	2.44%	0.83%	0.24%	0.05%	0.00%							
7		0.00%	0.12%	0.53%	0.28%	0.10%	0.04%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%						
8		0.00%	0.02%	0.10%	0.13%	0.07%	0.03%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%					
9		0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%				
10		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%				
11		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%			
12		0.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%							
13						0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		
14		0.00%														
15																
16				0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%



Modular affine equivalence (MAE)

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Summary 00

### All MAE classes

Modular S-box criteria in numbers:

- 30% of S-boxes: *D* = 4, *L* = 4
- 95% of S-boxes: *D*, *L* ∈ {4, 5}
- 0.5% of S-boxes: D ≥ 8 or L ≥ 8
- *L* = 2, *D* = 3: 170 classes
- *L* = 3, *D* = 2: 411 classes



Definitions o Modular affine equivalence (MAE)



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### Selected S-boxes

Selected 4-bit S-boxes from (Saarinen, 2011)<sup>6</sup>:

- $D, L \in \{3, 4, 5, 6, 7\}$ , most of them: L = 4, D = 4
- DES S5-1: *D* = 7, *L* = 4 (0.53%):

$$Pr(S(x+3) - S(x) = 8) = 7/16$$

$$Pr(S(x) = 5x + 1) = 7/16$$

• HAMSI, Serpent S2 (G1): *D* = 7, *L* = 3 (0.12%)



 $^6$ Saarinen MJ. Cryptographic analysis of all 4 imes 4-bit S-boxes. SAC 2011.

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### Modular S-box properties and optimal S-box classes

#### Research question reformulation

What is the statistical distribution of L- and D-criterium in MAE classes of small S-boxes?

#### Additional question

What is the statistical distribution of L- and D-criterium in case of optimal S-boxes (in 16 optimal LA classes)?



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### Technical note

- To explore all S-boxes in 16 optimal classes would take 1303× more time than to explore all class representatives.
- Our computation:
  - Let  $Aff = \{\mathcal{A}; \mathcal{A}(x) = \mathbf{A} \cdot x \oplus c\},\$
  - Aff<sub>L</sub> contains reps. of aA(x) + b 20160 permutations
  - Aff<sub>R</sub> contains reps. of A(ax + b) 20160 permutations
  - compute  $Aff_L \circ S \circ Aff_R$



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#### All optimal classes





- Best S-boxes have always (D, L) = (2, 3), or (D, L) = (3, 2)
- Maximum L is 11 (G7, G9, G10, G13), or 12
- Maximum D is 12 (G1, G3, G7, G9, G10, G11, G15), or 13



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#### Class G3 (finite field inverse)

DIL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1																
2			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%											
3		0.00%	0.83%	5.64%	2.46%	0.24%	0.00%									
4		0.00%	4.69%	31.31%	16.08%	2.96%	0.23%	0.00%								
5		0.00%	2.50%	15.19%	7.85%	1.86%	0.35%	0.03%	0.00%							
6			0.55%	3.22%	1.99%	0.65%	0.19%	0.04%	0.00%							
7		0.00%	0.09%	0.44%	0.23%	0.08%	0.03%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%						
8		0.00%	0.01%	0.07%	0.08%	0.05%	0.02%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%					
9			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%					
10			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%				
11																
12			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%							
13																
14																
15																
16																

- D and L in range 2 to 12
- 95.75% of S-boxes with *D*, *L* ∈ {4,5}
- 0.34% of S-boxes with *D* ≥ 8 or *L* ≥ 8



Modular affine equivalence (MAE)

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#### S-box distribution within classes





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Experimental results summary:

- 1. Optimal S-boxes w.r.t. standard linear and differential cryptanalysis have similar properties w.r.t. modular addition (with all classes and between them).
- 2. A small fraction of S-boxes optimal w.r.t. standard linear and differential cryptanalysis have very bad properties w.r.t. modular addition.



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# **Open questions**

- General theoretical analysis and good algebraic constructions?
- What about other operations, are there S-boxes good against every approximation?
- Can we break standard SL designs with bad modular S-boxes?
- Can weak modular S-boxes be used to backdoor<sup>7</sup> cipher designs?

<sup>7</sup>A Biryukov, L Perrin, A Udovenko: Reverse-Engineering the S-Box of Streebog, Kuznyechik and STRIBOBr1, 2016

